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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
injunction under New York Civil Practice Act § 876-a was deemed irrelevant
in interpreting the Unemployment Insurance Law. As noted above, the law
will normally be construed to bring benefits to as many unemployed workers
as possible. This was the apparent legislative intent. But it was also the
legislative intent that state funds not be used to support strikes. The statute was
meant to embody a "reconciliation of the purposes of unemployment insurance
with the principle of government neutrality. '34 This is the other side of the
scale that must be and has been properly balanced by the Court of Appeals.
R.V.B.

ZONING
REGULATION OF UNSAFE USE UPHELD
In Town of Hempstead v. Goldblattl the Court of Appeals upheld an
Appellate Division affirmance 2 of a judgment of Special Term 3 against defendants
Goldblatt, and the Builders Sand & Gravel Corp. Over constitutional objections,
an injunction was granted restraining defendants from operating their sand pit
before complying with a new Town Ordinance ostensibly intended to regulate
unsafe uses.
The Court of Appeals first recognized the presumption of constitutionality
of the Ordinance and properly placed the burden on the defendants to overcome
this presumption by proving the unreasonableness of its requirements. Defendants had been operating a sand pit since 1927, when the area was primarily
rural. In 1945, a six foot chain link fence topped with barbed wire was erected
around the 38 acre site in accordance with an ordinance passed by the town
that year. Eleven years later, the town sought unsuccessfully to restrain defendants from dredging operation in a zoned area (practically all of defendants'
excavation work is under water). There the trial court allowed the continuation
of business because it was a prior non-conforming use in which defendants had a
substantial investment.
Town Ordinance No. 16, in question here, was amended in 1958 to require,
among other things, that defendants fill in all previous excavation (averaging
25 feet over 20 acres), discontinue excavation below ground water level, place
a concrete footing under the 7000 lineal feet of fencing, and not dredge within
20 feet of any property line, as conditions to obtaining a permit and continuing
operations. Defendant was denied permission to introduce evidence as to the
market value of his property, but there was evidence available to the Court of
Appeals that the business grossed about $200,000 per year, which sum was also
34.
1.
2.
3.

Supra note 29 at 8, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
9 N.Y.2d 101, 211 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1961).
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close to an estimate of the value of the site and equipment based on assessment
for taxes. The ordinance of the town was ostensibly to protect against the
dangers of cave-ins, drownings and water pollution. There was no record of
any cave-in at the site, and defendants also showed that the excavation was
not stagnant. In 1944, there was a drowning in this pit. The following year,
however, the 6 foot fence was erected. Since then, there has been no reported
incident to demonstrate a continuing danger. But much testimony was given at
the trial level of a number of unfenced bodies of water in the area, about which
no protest or apprehension has been expressed.
In spite of the above state of facts, the Court of Appeals did not believe
the defendants had overcome the presumption of constitutionality. It recognized
instead the strength of the town's proof as to the great number of homes and
children nearby. From this, it found a danger within "common knowledge"
sufficient to warrant this statute as a valid exercise of police power in the
interest of the community's welfare and safety. "The hazards of both life and
property accompanying the uncontrolled operation of these pits are common
knowledge, and their restraint need not await an event." (Emphasis added.)
The Court appears to assume that the pits were unregulated. On the contrary,
the 1945 ordinance required set-backs, grading and the 6 foot fence. Also, why
are dangers so obvious around a well-fenced, set-back pit and not around the
many un-fenced, truly "uncontrolled" bodies of water nearby? To the contention that the ordinance was confiscatory, the Court said that operations were
not proscribed, but merely conditional. It very expansively noted that 18 acres
(of 38) were still available. But it didn't consider: 1) that excavations could
only go to ground water level; 2) the 20 foot set-back would take much of the
18 acres now above ground; 3) defendants' equipment and buildings occupies a
good portion of this land. The Court was perhaps a little too willing to bypass
the circumstances of the particular case and to fall back on generally acceptable
but broad statements of the wide sweep of the police power.
A dissenting opinion by Judge Van Voorhis expressed the belief that the
ordinance is an unconstitutional taking of property, and partially an ex post
facto law. The dissent recognizes the distinction raised by the town between
"an invalid retroactive zoning ordinance attempting to eliminate a nonconforming use" and a valid "'regulatory' ordinance which regulates the nonconforming use in the interest of public health and safety." But to the minority
this distinction is not decisive here, for while the ordinance, unlike the unsuccessful one in 1956, is couched in regulatory terms, the dissent reads it in
light of its practical affect. One million cubic yards of fill would be needed at
about $1 per yard, to meet but one requirement of continuing business. To
continue business without filling in the excavation lawfully made would subject
the defendants to criminal sanctions. This, the minority holds, would "render
criminal an act 'innocent when done'" in violation of Article I, Section 10 of
the United States Constitution.
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Judge Van Voorhis sees Ordinance No. 16 to be part of a continued town
attempt to put defendants out of business. In addition, he does not find that
the fenced pit constitutes any great hazard to human life, but finds it to be
"virtually conceded" that the 1945 provisions were sufficient protection.
To place the instant decision in proper perspective, a look at similar cases
is necessary. People v. Miller, decided in 1952, resulted in the upholding of an
ordinance which prohibited the raising of pigeons. 4 Although Miller's was a
prior non-conforming use, the Court ruled that his interest (monetary) was so
slight that it could be over-balanced by the public welfare. Trio District Corp. v.
City of Albany,5 although not dealing with a prior non-conforming use of land,
relates to the problem of how police power regulation could extend in New York.
There the City of Albany sought to enforce a regulation requiring pedlars of
Good Humor ice cream products to be accompanied by an attendant whose sole
duty was to protect approaching children from the passing motor vehicles. The
Court of Appeals there noted a previous attempt by the City in 1955 to require
an additional attendant to sell the pre-packaged ice cream to prevent contamination from the soiled hands of the driver. Considering these two attempts and
one in 1950 requiring a six month residency for pedlars, the Court held the
regulation unconstitutional as an unreasonable restriction designed to prohibit
the corporation's business "under the guise of regulation."
In the same year as the Trio case, 1957, the Court of Appeals decided
Harbison v. City of Buffalo. 6 Although there was a substantial investment
present in the form of a business reconditioning used steel drums, it was held
that a zoning law prohibiting this business after a three year grace period
would be constitutional if the grace period was reasonable. That case, however,
was clearly a zoning, rather than regulatory law. But there the Court noted that
the improvements consisted of a structure, and the same business might have
been carried on elsewhere. It did not reach the instance of a business directly
related to the particular land.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld an ordinance prohibiting the
manufacture of bricks by a prior user within the City of Los Angeles. In
Hadacheck v. Sebastian appellant had 8 acres of land containing a clay bed
and an accompanying brick kiln.7 The land was worth $800,000 as brickmaking property, but no more than $60,000 for residential purposes. Uncontradicted evidence was introduced of the prohibitive cost of removing the
clay to another location to be made into bricks. But the Court said it did not
reach a prohibition of the removal of the brick clay, but only a prohibition
against the manufacture of bricks.
The instant decision reflects a decided move by the Court of Appeals toward
4. 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).
5. 2 N.Y.2d 690, 163 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1957).
6. 4 N.Y.2d 553, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1957).
7. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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eliminating prior nonconforming uses by means of the police power of regulation.
It bad been law in New York that prior nonconforming uses could not be
prohibited by municipal action. See City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne.8 The
Miller case introduced the requirement that the right to be protected must be
substantial to counter-balance the public welfare. 9 Trio looked beyond the
words of the ordinance to find an attempt to prohibit under the "guise of
regulation."' 0 Regulation causing a great financial burden would be upheld
only where honest detriment to public good is evidenced.
The Court in Harbison v. City of Buffalo relaxed the rule of Miller
and held even where a structure represents considerable investment, it may be
eliminated as a non-conforming use after a reasonable time of notice is given
the owner to minimize his loss.'1 There, however, as noted above, the Court
did not pass on an ordinance prohibiting a use particular to land in question.
Goldblatt appears to have gone one big step further toward eliminating
non-conforming uses. It goes as far and perhaps farther than the United States
Supreme Court did in Hadacheck.12 Hadacheck may perhaps be distinguished
because it involved only the prohibition of a particular use, but in practical
effect on a prior non-conforming use it is analogous. In Hadacheck the Supreme
Court upheld a prohibition of a use although a very substantial investment was
jeopardized. Goldblatt also prohibits a use-dredging below water level-but
also required the filling in. In each case the court rationalized that the
individuals did not have the use of their property taken away. Hadacheck
could dig his clay and Goldblatt his sand, but this thinking avoids the practical
consequences of the respective ordinances.' 3 However, from a standpoint of the
statutes being constitutional as an exercise of police power necessary for the
public welfare, Goldblatt does not measure up to the standard of Hadackeck
as to the amount of proof of public danger or nuisance required. Hadacheck in
his proof had to overcome specific instances of illnesses resulting from smoke and
fumes from his brickyard. Goldblatt's interest was over-balanced by unproven,
general statements of danger of drownings and cave-ins which were at no
point linked with his specific pits. To this extent, Goldblatt exceeds even
Hadacheck. Once again relating Goldblatt to our New York law, it stands out
as the furthest projection to date of the Court's effort to give effect to zoning
law principles by regulating non-conforming uses.
R.V.B.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON NEw ZONING REGULATION MAY BE HAD PRIOR
TO APPLICATION FOR VARIANCE.

The case of Scarsdale Supply Co. v. Village of Scarsdale presents the
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